Public and private investments in plant breeding have a proven track record of increasing agricultural productivity, significantly contributing to economic well-being or social welfare. Substantial investments in research and development are required before a new plant variety can be developed and released, which the private sector can only recoup through commercial sales coupled with property rights. We previously published outcomes from economic modeling implementing different categories and hypothetical variants of intellectual property protection (IPP) in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology. Our goal here is to portray these outcomes using examples that will be more immediately familiar to the plant-breeding and policy-making communities. In so doing, we do not add to the analyses and arguments already presented. Our objective here is to make more accessible to a broader audience subject matter already presented in a more formal economic format by Lence et al. (2015). We found that plant variety protection (PVP) and utility patents played important and complementary roles in promoting and adopting innovation. Voluntary licensing under patents had a major contribution to social welfare. Periods of protection longer than the current life span of a utility patent did not contribute maximally to the stock of social welfare. We performed a reality check comparing different types of innovation and assessment of time and risk to commercialization. We hope that this information can contribute to more effective implementation of IPP to further promote genetic gain and thus enable commercially funded plant breeders to maximally contribute to the benefit of society on a global basis.
Property Protection (IPP) in the field of plant breeding and biotechnology. Our goal here is to 27 portray these outcomes in a manner and using examples that will be more immediately familiar 28 to the plant breeding and policy making communities. We found that Plant Variety Protection breeding and biotechnology is an issue of abiding interest to many including those in academia, 43 business, private and public sector research, policy makers, and non-governmental organizations 44 (NGOs). For example, see Leskien and Flitner (1997), Bioversity International (1999) The metric used for measuring success as a result of plant breeding was optimal genetic 252 innovation which we equated with optimal social welfare. We made this connection on the basis 253 that improvement of agricultural production through genetic gain and the improved protection of 254 that genetic potential in the face of biotic and abiotic stresses is basic to public policies that seek 255 to improve social welfare as a result of improved health and nutrition of consumers.
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Results from Modeling
257
Two Key Parameters
258
Results were sensitive to two key parameters. The first was parameter γ, which measured the 259 degree to which previous genetic research reduced the cost of, or levered, the ability to obtain 260 genetic improvements in a particular period. Projects that required a high degree of prior 261 research had a high value for γ. Intuitively, γ can also be understood as a measure of the degree 262 of research complexity. The second key parameter was (1 − ρ), the rate at which genetic other breeders as possible even before protection on these varieties expires. terms were investigated, a protection period of 10 years contributed more to social welfare than 285 did a 5 year period of protection unless there was an extremely rapid depreciation rate for the 286 innovation coupled with a low degree of specialization or research complexity (γ). not the case then the firm would not undertake the multiyear investment.
278
Changing the Length of Utility Patent Protection
342
Survey results are shown in Table 2 . Results suggested that single-gene backcrossing and Briefly, Lence et al. (2005) found that 1) IPP was necessary to encourage private breeding 361 companies to invest in research that would provide farmers with the best seed technology, 2)
362
There was an optimum duration of protection in relation to the contribution of innovation in 363 plant breeding research and product development to social welfare of just over 20 years, 3)
364
Benefits from higher and better quality yields were captured by farmers through reduced 365 production costs per unit harvested, 4) A multiplicity of benefits ultimately flowed to consumers 366 contributed by a) better quality food supporting human health, b) yield gains lowering the price 367 of harvested produce, and c) yield gains which offered the potential to take less productive or 368 more fragile lands out of agricultural production thereby supporting biodiversity and enabling a 369 cleaner environment.
370
Our results were in agreement with the discussion provided in Pardey et al. (2013) , 1997; Glaszmann et al., 2010; Lubberstedt, 2011; Kilian and Graner, 390 2012; Dhanapal and Govindaraj, 2015) . Not required by UPOV to be placed into the public domain although it is policy of USDA to make publicly available.
Made available upon issuance of patent. However, the deposit is "not a grant of license…to infringe the patent" (Harney and McBride, 2007) . Available in the public domain at the expiration of protection. The index measure time to commercialization relative to time to develop the improvement.
